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Abstract-Privacy is needed in ad hoc networks. An ad hoc on-demand position-based private routing algorithm, called A02P, is 
proposed for communication anonymity. Only the position of the destination is exposed in the network for route discovery. To discover 
routes with the limited routing information, a receiver contention scheme is designed for determining the next hop. pseudo identifiers 
are used for data packet delivery after a route is established. Real identities (IDS) for the source nodes, the destination nodes, and the 
forwarding nodes in the end-to-end connections are kept private. Anonymity for a destination relies on the difficulty of matching a 
geographic position to a real node ID. This can be enforced by the use of secure position service systems. Node mobility enhances 
destination anonymity by making the match of a node ID with a position momentary. To further improve destination privacy, R-A02P is 
proposed. In this protocol, the position of a reference point, instead of the position of the destination, is used for route discovery. 
Analytical models are developed for evaluating the delay in route discovery and the probability of route discovery failure. A simulator 
based on 77s-2 is developed for evaluating network throughput. Analysis and simulation results show that, while A02P preserves 
communication privacy in ad hoc networks, its routing performance is comparable with other position-based routing algorithms. 
Index Terms-Ad hoc routing protocol, anonymity, communication privacy, channel access mechanism 
P ROTECT~NG personal privacy is a prime concern for the emerging pervasive systems. As an important part of 
privacy, the user anonymity can improve security by 
making it difficult for adversaries to trace their potential 
victims and to conduct target-specific attacks. Achieving 
node privacy is challenging in ad hoc networks, where 
routing schemes rely on the cooperation and information 
exchange among the nodes. In routing algorithms such as 
AODV [I], DSR 121, and DSDV [3], a node has to disclose its 
identity (ID) in the network for building a route. Node 
activities, such as sending or receiving data, are highly 
traceable and, consequently, nodes are vulnerable to attacks 
and disruptions. 
The privacy preservation approaches in the literature do 
not directly extend to ad hoc networks. The use of broadcast 
[4] or multicast [5] for receiver privacy are not suitable; as in 
ad hoc networks, the bandwidth is limited, and multicast 
itself is a challenging problem [ 6 ] .  The K-anonymity 
algorithm [7] achieves anonymity by keeping the entity of 
interest within a group. Yet it is not easy to maintain such a 
group with a fixed proxy in an ad hoc network due to the 
node mobility and the continuous join-and-leave activities. 
The dynamic nature also makes i t  difficult to use the 
anonymity solutions based on trusted third parties [8]. In 
approaches applying the onion structure 191, [lo], where 
anonymity can be realized in a multihop path by keeping 
each node along the path aware of oi~ly its previous hop 
and next hop, the cost of using public keys is high. 
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Geographic or position-based routing algorithms for ad 
hoc networks have been widely studied [I].]. In addition to 
node ID, extra information, such as the positions of the 
nodes, is used for making routing decisions. Since it is 
unlikely that two ad hoc nodes are concurrently at exactly 
the same position, the match between a position and an ID is 
unique. Therefore, in position-based routing algorithms, if 
the positions have been exposed for routing, node IDS do  not 
need to be revealed. If an adversary cannot match a position 
to a node ID correctly, node anonymity can be achieved. 
However, using position instead of ID for route manage- 
ment in traditional positioning routing algorithms does not 
guarantee node anonymity. These algorithms rely on the 
position exchange among the neighboring nodes. A pre- 
vious hop knows the positions of its neighbors, so that it can 
select the next hop that is the closest to the destination. Such 
an information exchange is normally through a periodic 
message that is locally broadcast by each node. The message 
is called a "hello" message and carries an updated position 
of the sender. These time-based position reports make a 
node highly traceable. An eavesdropper can determine 
whether the "hello" messages are from the same node based 
on the time they are sent out. The trajectory of a node 
movement can be well-known to other nodes even when its 
ID is intentionally hidden. It is much easier to obtain a 
node ID based on its trajectory. Furthermore, if a tracer has 
determined the node ID correctly, it can always stay close to 
this node and monitor its behavior. The transmission jitter 
for "hello" messages may make tracing a little more 
difficult, yet it is not sufficient to protect a node's trajectory 
from being discovered. 
Lack of privacy in traditional positioning ad hoc routing 
algorithms is mainly caused by the extensive position 
information exposure. To achieve communication anonym- 
ity, a position-based ad hoc routing algorithm, named 
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A02P, is proposed. A02P works in the network with 
relatively high node densities, where the positions of 
destinations are the only position information disclosed in 
the network for routing. In A02P, a route is discovered by 
delivering a routing request message from the source 
towards the position of the destination. However, A02P 
does not rely on the local position information exchange. To 
determine the next hop with limited position information, 
an approach similar to Anycast [12] is developed, which 
relies 011 a proposed ~ P C P I ' E ~ E I .  c o ~ i f f i ? f i o i ~  channel access 
mechanism. 
In A0213, once a pre\,ious hop sends out a routing 
request, its neighboring nodes who receive the request will 
contend to access the channel to be the next hop. In the 
receiver contention mechanism, receiving nodes are divided 
into different classes according to how close they can bring 
the routing request toward the destination. A receiver 
geographically closer to the destination is assigned to a class 
with a higher priority, and it generally can win the 
contention. This results in the routes with a lower number 
of hops. Fewer forwarders are needed and, hence, the ad hoc 
channel is shared by fewer nodes. In a network with a fixed 
data rate, these routes generally have a better routing 
performance. 
Once a route is built, pseudo IDS and temporary MAC 
addresses are used for the nodes in the routes, such as 
sources, destinations, and intermediate forwarders. Since 
the node identities are not disclosed, communication 
anonymity can be achieved. For a destination whose 
position is revealed, its privacy is preserved by hiding the 
match between a position and its ID through the secure 
position management scheme. Eavesdroppers or attackers 
only know that a node at a certain position will receive data, 
but they do not know which node it is. On the other hand, 
the routing accuracy is guaranteed because at most one 
node can be at a specific geographic position at one time. 
The position and the time are used as the inputs of the hash 
function, which generates a node's pseudo ID. The 
possibility that two nodes have the same pseudo ID so that 
data may be delivered to the wrong node is negligible. 
A02P mitigates the attacks on node anonymity from 
both external and internal attackers with the assistance of 
secure position services. Node authentication and encryp- 
tion can prevent an external attacker from learn~ng a node's 
position. For an internal attacker, position management 
policy will be enforced so that a node cannot abuse position 
information for tracing purposes. Such an attacker may 
obtain fractions of position information of its target. 
However, the information is incomplete and will not be 
enough for attacker to trace a moving target. 
The contributions of this paper are the design and 
routing performance evaluation for the proposed anon- 
ymous positioning routing algorithm. We build analytical 
models for evaluating the performance metrics, such as the 
delay in route discovery and the probability of a route 
discovery failure with or without position errors. We use 
simulation to evaluate performance metrics, such as the 
impact of destination mobility, the hop counts in the 
discovered routes, and the network end-to-end throughput. 
Node anonymity can be evaluated in terms of the size of 
anonymity set [13], probability [ l o ] ,  [14], and entropy [15]. 
This is our on-going research and will be presented in a 
future paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
briefly presents related research. In Section 3, the details of 
the routing algorithm are presented. In Section 4, the delay 
for the routing discovery and the probability of routing 
discovery failure are analyzed. Section 5 shows analysis and 
simulation results. Section 6 provide the conclusions and 
future works. 
Anonymous communication in ad hoc networks has been 
studied in 1161. A novel untraceable on-demand routing 
protocol, named ANODR, is proposed. Onion structure is 
used for routing discovery. To reduce the cost and latency of 
the encryption/decryption, a symmetric key based Boomer- 
n i ~ g  Oiiioiis is used. Once a route is found, pseudorandom 
numbers are used as temporary IDS for the nodes along the 
route. Each node only knows the pseudo numbers from its 
previous hop and next hop. The communication privacy is 
achieved because real IDS are not revealed. The protocol is 
robust to intrusion since the intrusion in a single node en 
route does not result in ID exposure. 
A position-based ad hoc routing algorithm, named a 
greedy perimeter stateless routing (GPSR), is presented in 
[17]. A packet is always forwarded to the next hop that is 
geographically closest to the destination. Such an approach 
is scalable since it does not need route disco\rery and 
maintenance, and the position information is exchanged 
locally among neighbor nodes by periodically sending out a 
beacon. GPSR may not always find the optimum route. 
When nodes are not uniformly distributed in the network, 
there will be dead ends, in which a node cannot find any 
next hop closer to the destination. GPSR solves this problem 
by routing around the perimeter of its local region. Other 
approaches to solving the dead end problem, named Face 
Routing and GFG (Greedy-Face-Greedy) schemes, are 
proposed in [ l a ] .  Some other delivery-guaranteed methods 
are based on the single-path strategy [19], [20]. A route from 
the source to the destination is built before data packets can 
be delivered. 
The position-based routing algorithms depend on the 
position availability. It is assumed that a source is able to 
get the position of its destination. The Global Positioning 
System (GPS) helps a node to get its own position. How a 
source gets the position of its destination is a challenging 
task. In an ad hoc/cellular integrated environment [21], the 
position of a destination can be obtained through paging or 
the short message service through the cellular network. A 
source node sends a position request to the cellular 
network. The cellular network pages the destination. The 
destination replies with its position, which is forwarded to 
the source. This out-of-band solution is simple since it has 
little signaling overhead and operational complexity. When 
an out-of-band server is not available, iiz-bai~d position 
servers are designed. In [22], each node has a geographical 
region around a fixed center. The region is called a virtual 
home region (VHR) and the ad hoc node updates its 
position information to all the nodes residing in its VHR. 
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The relationship between a node ID and the fixed center of 
its VHR follows a hash function, so that other nodes can 
acquire a node's position by sending request to the right 
VHR. A similar distributed position service system, named 
DLM (Distributed Location Management), is studied in [23]. 
In this section, we first introduce a secure position service 
system that is necessary for privacy preservation in 
positioning ad hoc routing algorithms. We then describe 
the proposed anonymous routing algorithm, where the 
details on A02P route discovery and maintenance are 
given. Next, we present a receiver classification scheme, 
followed with the receiver contention scheme. Based on 
these two schemes, A02P can process efficient route 
discovery. Finally, an enhanced algorithm that further 
improves destination anonymity is given. 
3.1 Position Management 
We propose a virtual home region (VHR)-based distributed 
secure position service, named DISPOSER. An ad hoc node 
is assumed to be able to obtain its own geographic position 
through GPS. Each node has a VHR, which is a geographi- 
cal region around a fixed center. The relationship between a 
node ID and its VHR center follows a hash function. This 
function is predefined and known to all the nodes who join 
the network. A number of servers, which are also ad hoc 
nodes, are distributed in the network. A node updates its 
~osi t ion to the servers located in its VHR. to which other 
nodes send position request acquiring this node's position. 
A node updates its position to its VHR when the distance 
between its current position and the last reported position 
exceeds a threshold value. The threshold value is deter- 
mined by finding out that, if a destination moves a certain 
distance away from the position known to the source, what 
the probability is of a routing failure caused by this position 
drift. Simulation is done to study the relationship between 
this threshold value and the probability of a routing failure 
in Section 5.2.2. Since the positions of VHRs are known, 
position update and position request can use the A02P 
routing algorithm. In this way, DISPOSER message delivery 
does not require a node to process a time-based position 
update to its neighboring nodes. 
DISPOSER enhances position security. Only a small 
number of trusted nodes can act as position servers. To 
obtain the position of a certain node, a requester has to send 
a signed position request. The position information is 
encrypted and will not be learned by other users during 
the position management. Positions are used for routing 
only. A mechanism has been designed, which constrains a 
node to use position for route discovery only. After 
obtaining a node position, the node requester has to prove 
to the servers that it has built a meaningful communication 
with that node as its destination, normally by showing a 
ticket assigned by the destination. The position abuse when 
a node continuously sends position requests for tracing a 
target node is prevented. More details on DISPOSER 
security procedures are in [24]. 
When the source gets the position of its destination, it also 
gets the time when the position is updated and an 
authentication code. The time is needed for routing 
accuracy. The secret code can be a random number, which 
is generated and sent to the position server by the 
destination along with its position update. The authentica- 
tion code is used for destination authentication in the A02P 
route discovery stage. 
3.2 A02P Routing Protocol 
In A02P, a source discovers the route through the delivery 
of a routing request to its destination. A node en-route will 
generate a pseudo node ID and a temporary MAC address. 
Once a route is built up, data is forwarded from the source 
to the destination based on the pseudo IDS. This section 
gives the details on A02P routing discovery. Other issues, 
such as data delivery, route maintenance, and pseudo ID 
management, are addressed. 
Once a source needs to find the route to its destination, it 
first generates a pseudo ID and a temporary MAC address 
for itself through a globally defined hash function using its 
position and the current time as the inputs. Such a 
procedure makes the probability that two active nodes 
(i.e., nodes involved in routing) have the same ID and MAC 
address small and negligible. The source then sends out a 
routing request (rreq) message. 
The we9 message carries the information needed for 
routing, such as the position of the destination and the 
distance from this source to the destination, as well as the 
source pseudo ID. Since it is possible that another node has 
updated the same position (yet at a different time) to the 
position servers, a destination challenge message is carried 
in the rreq to make sure that the right destination will be 
reached. This message is also a result of a hash function, of 
which the inputs are the position of the destination and the 
time at which this position is updated. rreq carries the 
challenge message instead of the time for less information 
revelation. rreq also carries a Time-to-Live (TTL) number 
that deals with the possible loop. TTL is the maximum 
number of the hops a rreq can be forwarded. A source node 
can estimate the TTL value according to the distance from 
the source to the destination and the radio transmission 
range for each hop. 
The neighboring nodes around the source, called 
receivers, will receive the rreq. A receiver checks the 
destination challenge message to find out whether it is the 
destination. If not, a receiver assigns itself to a receiver class 
following the rules in Section 3.3. Each receiver uses a hash 
function to generate a pseudo ID and a temporary MAC 
address. The inputs of the hash function are the receiver's 
position and the time i t  receives the rreq. The receivers then 
contend for the wireless channel to send out a hop reply 
(\?rep) message in a so-called rreq contention phase. Details 
of this receiver-contention mechanism are described in 
Section 3.4. The receiver who has successfully sent out the 
11rep will be the next hop. Its pseudo ID is carried in the \?rep. 
On receiving the \?rep, the source replies with a coizjirill 
(cizji7z) message. Its next hop replies to this message with an 
nck. Upon receiving the nck, the source saves the pseudo ID 
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Source Forwarder Forwarder Forwarder Destination 
I rreq _i I 
. .  MAC headec- 
-I 
Bytes: 2 , 6 1 -2, 
-- 
-- 
1 ~ r e ~  ~ e q  Sender I Destination I Posilion,orrD-: 
Number Pseudo ID Ch;~llenge Desl~na~lon 1 Desl~n;lt~on 
L- I 
Fig. 1. Message flow in A02P routing discovery. 
After receiving the cnfin, the next-hop receiver becomes a 
sender.' It sends out the modified rreq, which carries the 
distance from itself to the destination. The TTL value is 
reduced by 1. Neighboring nodes around it will contend to 
be its next hop. once the sender receives a hrep, it couples 
the pseudo ID and the temporary MAC address of its next 
hop with those of its previous hop and saves the pairs in the 
routing table. 
The searching of the next hop is repeated until the 
destination receives the rreq. After identifying the destina- 
- - 
tion challenge message, the destination sends out a I~rep. 
Based on Section 3.4, it can always send out the Iirep 
successfully. After receiving the cl7fin from its previous hop, 
the destination sends a rolrting reply (rrep) message through 
the reverse path to the source. The destination also finds the 
corresponding authentication co<e according to the posi- 
tion carried in the rreq and encrypts the code with the secret 
key of its public/secret key pair. The encrypted result is 
included in the rrep and sent to the source. The source finds 
out whether it reaches the right destination by decrypting 
the information with the destination's public key and 
comparing the authentication code with the one it obtained 
through the position request. 
The message flow in A02P routing discovery is shown in 
Fig. 1. The frames for important control messages are 
shown in Fig. 2. 
A route discovery failure will occur when a sender 
cannot find a legitimate next hop. Routing discovery failure 
may also be caused due to destination mobility. A typical 
case for this type of routing failure is that a vieq has been 
forwarded close to the position at which the destination was 
expected to be, yet the destination cannot receive the rreq 
because it has moved away. In both cases, a routing 
discovery failure report will be sent back to the source. The 
source will start a new route search based on the 
destination's most updated position after a backoff time. 
After a route is built up, data packets are delivered 
following the pseudo ID and temporary MAC address pairs 
in the routing tables. Routing maintenance mechanisms in 
traditional ad hoc routing algorithms can be used for A02P. 
When a route is broken, an erroy message will be sent back 
/ I-rcq Seq. Number Recei\.el.Pseudo ID / 
MAC header 
6 6 J 
, -  
Fig. 2. Frames of control messages in A02P routing discovery. (a) rreq 
frame. (b) hrep frame. (c) cnfm frame. 
1 ,FF;;;~ DUr'dIion 1 Sc~ider mnp. Addr 
to the source by the node who has discovered the broken 
link. In AOZP, during the communication, the destination 
will update its new position to the source through the 
reverse route. The source can thus start a new routing 
discovery using the updated position information. 
A node will generate a pair of a pseudo ID and a 
temporary MAC address only when it receives a rreq. If it 
wins the next hop contention and is included in the route, it 
will use the pair for data delivery. Otherwise, the ID and 
MAC address pair will be deleted. It is possible that a node 
is included in more than one route. In this case, only one 
pseudo ID and one temporary MAC address are used. A 
node deletes the pair of the pseudo ID and the temporary 
MAC address if the route in which the pair is used no 
longer exists. This happens when data delivery is finished, a 
routing error message is received, or the pair has not been 
used for a long time. 
3.3 Receiver Classification 
A receiver determines its node class by finding that, if it is 
the next hop, how much closer (this geographic distance is 
defined as A d )  it can move a rreq from the sender toward 
the destination. A d  can be calculated because the distance 
between the receiver and the destination is known based on 
their positions and the distance between the sender and the 
destination is carried in the rreq. 
A simple illustrated example of node classification is 
Rcceiwr 
Trmp. Addr 
7 .  A ser?dri. is d e f i e d  as  the source or an intermediate node  who shown in Fig. 3. In this nodes except the 
forwards the  rreq message. destination are divided into four node classes. A distance of 
cnfln msge FCS 
I i , . . . , /J 20
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slot c only i f  n o  burst is sent  in the previous 
. . . . . . . . . .  ,.'.,/, .. 
c - 1 prioritization slots. This also means that it has the 
. . . . . . . . .  highest priority in this contending cycle. This receiver will 
~.~~ ~ . . then enter the next phase. If a receiver senses a burst in any 
Fig. 3. Classifying nodes based on the positions 
d is calculated as d = r / 3 ,  where 1- is the maximum radio 
coverage of the ad hoc channel. Nodes with Ad > 2d (e.g., 
node A, as it falls in the circle centered at the destination 
with a radius of 1 - 2rl) belong to class 1, which has the 
highest priority. Nodes with rl 5 Ad < 2d (e.g., node B) and 
nodes with 0 < Ad < (1 (e.g., nodes C and D) belong to 
Class 2 and 3, respectively, and have lower priorities. For 
nodes E, F, and G, Ad < 0. They belong to class 1 and will 
lead the w e q  away from the destination. Other nodes, such 
as H and I, are out of the sender's transmission range and 
cannot receive the rreq. Note that the destination is a special 
node. It has the highest priority to access the channel with a 
cIass of 0. In-this paper, we investigated the algorithm in 
which only nodes of class 1, 2, and 3 will contend to be 
legitimate receivers. A node of class 4 will not attend the 
contention because it leads a rreq away from the destination. 
The node classification scheme is used only for simplicity 
of presentation and will be used in the rest of the paper. In 
more complicated schemes, rules for node classification can 
be adaptive based on node density. When the density is 
high, only the nodes that can greatly reduce the distance 
between the rreq and the destination should be assigned to 
the class with a high priority. On the other hand, if the 
nodes are sparsely distributed, a node which leads the rreq 
away from the destination can also be a possible legitimate 
- 
receiver. Such a rule adaptation, for example, can be made 
by adjusting the value of d. Besides the distance to the 
destination, other criteria, such as signal quality, the 
remaining power of a node, and node mobility, can also 
be considered in node classification. 
3.4 A02P hrep Contention Mechanism 
The receiver-contention mechanism used in the 11rep 
contention phase is EY-NPMA (Elimination Yield-Non- 
preemptive Priority Multiple Access), the channel access 
mechanism for HIPERLAN 1 (251, [26]. The main reasons 
for using EY-NPMA for hrep contention are: 1 )  EY-NPMA is 
a classlbased channel access mechanism, while, in A02P, 
receivers are divided into different classes, 2) the prob- 
ability of a successful transmission for EY-NPMA is very 
high even when there are a large number of contending 
of the previous slots, it will quit from 17rep contention. In 
A02P, the receivers that cannot enter the next phase will 
drop the rreq. The first slot of the prioritization phase is 
reserved for destination, which is called Destination Ac- 
knoiuledgnlelif Slot. Only a destination can send a burst on 
this slot. In this way, the destination receiving a rreq can 
always have access to the channel successfully. 
The elimination phase starts immediately after the 
transmission of the prioritization burst and consists of a 
number of slots. An A02P receiver who enters this phase 
will transmit burst in a randomly selected number of 
continuous slots, starting from the first one in this phase. 
The receivers transmitting the longest series of bursts will 
survive. After the end of the burst transmission, each 
receiver senses the channel for the duration of the 
elimination survival verification slot. If the channel is 
sensed to be idle, the receiver is admitted to the yield 
phase; otherwise, it drops itself from contention. The length 
of the burst follows a truncated geometric probability 
distributed function. A transmission parameter, PE, is used 
to adjust the burst length. Let m ~ - s  to be the number of 
overall elimination slots and P,(n) be the probability that 
the burst is transmitted in the consecutive n slots. P,(n) is 
specified as: 
The yield phase starts immediately after the end of the 
elimination survival verification interval. Before transmit- 
ting a I~rep ,  a receiver will yield for a number of slots from O 
to m1.s with equal likelihood. It listens to the channel and, if  
the channel is sensed idle during the yield listening interval, 
- < - 
it will send out the 11rep. Otherwise, the receiver loses 
contention and drops the rreq.  Let c1(n) to be the 
probability that a receiver will wait for n slots before it 
sends out the 11rep. Then, 
PI/(,) = l /  ( ~ n ~ , ~  + 1). 0 < n < ~ILIJS.  (2) 
When more than one receiver sends out an hrep at the 
same time, a 11rep collision occurs. In this case, the sender 
will resend the rreq. On the other hand, if the sender cannot 
hear any burst in the prioritization period, it means there 
: : FD I I -
. . if .
(1 )
(2)
0:'::: n < TIlL',.
n = mLS.
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Fig. 4. Illustration of A02P channel access mechanism in routing discovery. 
are no potential next hops at that time. In that case, it will 
backoff and resend the rreq after a backoff time. 
The complete channel access mechanism for A02P 
routing discovery is summarized in Fig. 4. A traditional 
channel access mechanism such as CSMA/CA is consid- 
ered to be used for a rreq or a data packet. Before a rreq 
message or a data packet is sent, the channel has to be 
sensed idle for a distributed interframe space (DIFS) of 
time. There is a short interframe space (SIFS) between 
message exchange for data packet forwarding and rreq 
forwarding, except for the time internal between a rreq and 
its hrep. This interval depends on the duration of the lzrep 
contention phase. In A02P, a rreq retransmission has a 
higher priority. The sender has to wait for only a SIFS before 
the retransmission. To avoid any other transmission during 
a /?rep contention period, DIFS has to be longer than the 
longest idle period in the hrep contention phase. In A02P, 
DIFS has to be longer than the entire yield phase. 
3.5 Communication Anonymity and Privacy 
Enhancement 
In A02P, the identities for the two ends (source and 
destination) of a communication are anonymous to other 
nodes. A02P also protects the privacy for nodes acting as 
intermediate forwarders, as they do  not need to expose any 
information during data delivery. This is important for 
communication privacy in ad hoc networks. Unlike wired 
networks, in which a forwarder is normally a fixed router 
without the necessity to hide any information from others, 
in ad hoc networks, a forwarder is also a potential source or 
destination. The exposure of private information of a node 
during its action of forwarding may cause privacy loss in its 
previous or future communication sessions. 
Destination has the lowest privacy because its position is 
revealed to the network for routing. Node movement can 
enhance the destination privacy because, if a node is 
mobile, the match between a position and the node ID is 
momentary. A single position release may not lead to severe 
privacy degradation. 
Protecting destination position from adversaries can 
further improve destination anonymity. To hide this 
information from the eavesdroppers, a position of a rejerei7ce 
point can be used in a rreq instead of the real position of the 
destination. The corresponding routing protocol is called 
A02P with reference point, or R-A02P. The reference point 
is on the extended line from the sender to the destination, as 
shown in Fig. 5a. The distance between the reference point 
and the destination is a large random value, based on which 
a tracer cannot estimate the real position of the destination. 
The node classification for receivers can use the similar 
rules as those in Section 3.3, with the difference that the 
class of a receiver is determined by how closer it can 
process a packet to the reference point. The rules for node 
classification based on destination and a reference point are 
compared in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b. S1, Sr, and S3 are the areas 
where the nodes belonging to class 1, class 2, and class 3 are 
located. The solid lines in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b are part of the 
circles centered at the reference point and the destination, 
respectively (referring to Fig. 3). Generally, a node closer to 
the reference point is also closer to the destination. Nodes at 
some special positions have the higher node class levels in 
R-A02P than in A02P. For example, node at position A has 
a class level of 3 in A02P, yet it has a class level of 2 in R- 
A02P. In R-A02P, Node A has a better opportunity to win 
the hrep contention. The routes discovered by R-A02P may 
then have larger hop counts. However, the hop count 
increase is not significant because nodes at most positions 
have the same class level. It should also be noted that, for R- 
A02P, some nodes residing in SL3 may lead a packet away 
from the destination. 
In R-A02P, the next hop will obtain the position of the 
destination from the sender after it wins the \?rep contention. 
The position is encrypted by a Diffie-Hellman key to keep it 
from being learned by other nodes. The Diffie-Hellman key, 
not the public key of the next hop, is used to prevent the 
identity exposure for the intermediate nodes. The Diffie- 
Hellman key is set up during Izrep and cn fw  exchange. hrep 
carries the initiation of the key and ci3fi7z replies with the rest 
part of the key. c17fi77 also carries the encrypted position of 
the destination. After receiving the position of the destina- 
tion, the next hop can generate a reference point at the 
extended line from itself to the destination and sends out a 
rreq carrying the position of the new reference point. The 
6 I I , . , /
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Reference Point 
. . . . . . . 
(a) 
Fig. 5. Reference point and the receiver classification. (a) Node classification based on a reference point. (b) Node classification based on 
destination. 
procedure is repeated until the rye9 finally reaches the where PE{B = j )  is the probability that a burst has a length 
destination. of j, as that in (1). PE{B < j} is the probability that a burst 
has a length less than j and is specified as follows: 
In A02P, a hop reply (/?rep) contention period may cause 
extra delay in the route discovery. If such a delay is large, 
a routing failure or a route discovery failure may occur 
because the destination may have already moved away 
from the position known to the source. A route discovery 
failure may also be caused by inaccurate position 
information or the network topology where a next hop 
cannot be found. In this section, we first analyze the /?rep 
average delay. Based on this delay, the average time 
needed for a successful next hop determination is 
calculated. We then present the analysis for the probability 
of a route discovery failure under different node distribu- 
tions and position accuracy. 
The receivers with the longest burst will enter the yield 
phase. Let B , ( s .  n,) be the average number of bursts a 
successful receiver sends, on the condition that there are 
n receivers entering the elimination phase and s receivers 
win. In this case, 
The average burst length that a successful receiver sends 
when there are n receivers in the elimination phase, 
4.1 Delay for A02P Next Hop Searching denoted as BL'(n), is calculated as: 
The definitions of major symbols used in our analysis are 
listed in Table 1. We calculate DnLQ(n), the average time 
for next hop determination when there are initially n 
contenders. 
Since we are considering a network with relatively high 
node density, for the simplicity of analysis, it can be 
assumed that, for a sender, neighbors belonging to the class 
with the highest priority are always available. Thus, in the 
]?rep prioritization phase, the delay is approximately the 
time duration for two slots: the destination acknowledg- 
ment slot and the slot for the class with the highest priority. 
It is assumed that n receivers belong to the class with the 
highest priority and will enter the elimination phase upon 
receiving a rreq. The probability that a number of s receivers 
will succeed in the elimination phase and enter the yield 
phase, denoted as P ~ { s l n } ,  is: 
BL.(n) = ) B, ( s .n )P~{sJn} .  
s=l 
( 6 )  
In the yield phase, let P),{T = 1 Is) be the probability of a 
successful transmission when there are s receivers joining 
the contention. A successful transmission occurs only when 
one receiver waits for fewer yield slots than all of the others. 
In this case, 
where L is the number of yield slots a successful receiver 
will wait. Pl.{L = j }  depends on (2), and 
The average number of slots a successful receiver will 
yield before transmitting hrep when there are s of 
FD I I - 7
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TABLE 1 
Mathematical Symbols Used in the Analysis 
7.s)'.\3c' 
I l l  p- 
i p -  
'I71 F; .5 
~ E S  
I l l ) ' . <  
i s s  
P 7 ( 1 1 )  
B 
L 
BE 0 1 )  
I!,. ( ~ 1 )  
L'>. (11) 
- 




D I < E Q ( I ~ . ~  
time duration for synchronization interval 
number of slots in prioritization phase 
time duration for il prioritiza~io~i slot 
numbcr of slots in elimination phasc 
time duration for a eli~nination slot 
number of slots in yield phase 
time dul.ation for a yield slot 
probability of a successful / I I - ~ >  attempt urnon2 7 1  contenders 
nnmber of bursts transmitted in the elimination phase 
number of slots yielded in the yield phase 
merase number of bursts in elimination phase when 11 receivers are in l l r e p  contelltion 
aueraFe number ol' yield slots in a successflil attempt ~ r h e n  11 receivers are in l f r q  contention 
average number of yield slot!, in a failed attempt when -11 receivers are in hrrp contenlion 
avcl-aee lime Tor a succeh<ful ~ I V J  tri~n\mi\sion cyclc 
average lime for a failed hr-ep transmission cycle 
average time for next hop determination when there are initially 1 ,  contenders 
n receivers entering the yield phase, denoted as I,(.s. n),  is 
calculated as: 
The average number of slots a successful receiver will 
yield before it sends the /?rep when n receivers are in the 
elimination phase, denoted as E,.(n), is as follows: 
Let the time duration for a slot in the prioritization 
phase, the elimination phase, and the yield phase be ips, 
iLs, and il.s, respectively. Let isl..yc. be the time interval for 
synchronization before hrep contention. The average delay 
for a successful hrep contention in the first attempt under 
the condition that there are n receivers entering the 
elimination phase, denoted as Dl-(n), is: 
The corresponding average time for a successful next 
hop searching cycle from rreq to the nck, denoted as t.,,,.,(n), 
is given as: 
where i ,.,,, /, I,,,- ,,,, i,.,,~ ,,, i,,,~., and islr.s are the time duration 
for rreq, hrep, ci~fiiz, ack, and SIFS, respectively. 
In /?rep contention phase, a transmission failure is caused 
by lwep collision when more than one receivers send Izrep 
simultaneously, After detecting a I~rep collision, the sender 
will wait for a SIFS before it resends a rreq. 
Let E1(71:. s l  n)  be the average number of slots in the yield 
phase in a failed /?rep contention when u: of s  receivers have 
the shortest yield phase and send the hr41. TL is the number 
of contenders in the elimination phase. Let 8 - { T  = w(s)  be 
the corresponding probability of such a case. It is given as 
follows: 
where 2ips stands for the two slots in the prioritization 
phase and the iLs at the end is for the survival verification 
interval. 
Note that 2 5 w 5 s. A failed hrep contention thus 
implies that there are at least two receivers entering the 
8 I I IL I , L 4, .3, /J 2005
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yield phase. Since, in I m p ,  the probability that no receiver 
enters the yield phase is 0, the probability that more than 
one receiver enters the yield phase is ( 1  - P ~ { l l n ) ) .  
L1(u:. s .  nj  is calculated as follows: 
In a failed transmission, the average number of the yield 
slots before any receiver transmits a I m p  when there are s 
receivers in the yield phase, denoted as L1(s) ,  is given as: 
The average number of yield slots before any receiver 
transmits a I m p  when there are n receivers in the 
elimination phase, denoted as Lt l / (n ) ,  is given as: 
Assume that a previous hrep contention with n con- 
tenders fails and is followed by a new contention. Let 
- 
Dm.(n) be the average contention time for a failed I m p  
contention, which can be calculated by: 
Let tf,,;, be the time needed for the sender to detect a Izrep 
failure since it transmits rreq, which can be calculated by: 
The probability of a successful transmission among 
n contending receivers in the elimination phase, denoted 
as Py,(n), is: 
Fig. 6. Impact of position error on routing discovery. 
4.2 Routing Failure and Impact of Inaccurate 
Position Information 
The low-cost high-accuracy position service is not yet 
available. There are relatively large position errors for 
either the GPS system, or the cellular position (location) 
service system, especially when considering that such a 
facility used at the mobile device must be small and low 
power-consuming. 
h A02P, the position error at senders or receivers may 
make the receivers assign themselves to the wrong classes. 
A node actually closer to the destination may lose I m p  
contention to a node actually farther away. The end-to-end 
multihop connection based on these inaccurate positions 
may not be the best in terms of number of hops. However, 
position errors will not cause a routing failure by generating 
the links that actually do not exist, because only a node 
receiving a rreq can possibly be the next hop. The 
connection between a sender and a receiver thus is always 
real regardless of wrong positions. 
Assume that the maximum error of a position service is E ,  
which means the real position may be as far as E away from 
the position given by the position service provider. Assume 
that the average geographic distance for each hop is d when 
Assume that a sender has to send the rreq I; times before it the correct positions are used. When there is a position 
error, the percentile increase for the number of hops may at 
receives a /?rep successfully. The average delay for a sender 
most be 100 x (A) percent. to determine its next hop when there are n neighboring More seriously, position error may cause extra routing 
contending to be the next is denoted 
' R L U ( ~ )  discovery failure Based on the wrong positions, a legit- 
and can be calculated by: imate receiver may think it cannot process the rreq closer to 
Our observations and the data with some sample values 
for various parameters is given in Section 5. 
the destination and does not participate in Ivep  contention. 
This potential link cannot be used by the sender even if  it 
cannot find any other legitimate next hop. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the worst case of how the position error 
affects A02P routing discovery. r is the ad hoc radio 
coverage. Due to the position error of E, a sender with the 
actual position of I: thinks that it is at the position F'. The 
destination thinks that it is at D' instead of D. Thus, the 
sender thinks the distance between the destination and 
itself is d instead of the real distance of d + 26. A legitimate 
next hop can only be from S1, since only the nodes in S1 are 
within the radio coverage from F and has a shorter distance 
to D' than that from F' to D'. A route discovery failure will 
occur if there is no node in Sl. If both the sender and the 
: I - ED I 9
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Fig. 7. Probability for successful hrep transmission at different Pr. 
receiver have the right positions, the probability of a routing 
failure will decrease. This occurs when there is no node in 
both of the areas S, and Sz. 
If a large number of A' nodes are uniformly distributed in 
an ad hoc network covering an area of S, the node density p 
then is .Y/S. For any area of So, the probability that no node 
resides in it, denoted as ps,,(n = O), is as follows: 
pSo is the number of the nodes residing in the area So. 
When !Y is large enough compared to pSo, 
The probability that there is at least one node in area So, 
denoted as Ps,,(n. 2 l), is: 
Let us define pl as the probability of such a routing 
discovery failure for the worst case of position errors and p2 
as the probability of a routing discovery failure when there 
is no position error. Referring back to Fig. 6, when the nodes 
are uniformly distributed with a density of p, based on the 
previous analysis results, 
where SI and S? are functions of t- and d. 
In R-A02P, d >> T .  At the source and each forwarding 
node, the worst case scenario (refer to Fig. 6) results in 
approximately the same S1 and S?. Therefore, the prob- 
ability of a route discovery failure with and without 
position error, i.e., p, and p?, are approximately the same. 
In a n-hop end-to-end connection, the probability of a 
routing failure with and without position errors can be 
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Fig. 8. Average time to determine a next hop at different PE 
5 ~LLUSTRATIVE DATA AND OBSERVATIONS 
~ - 
In this section, we present both analysis and simulation 
studies. We first present the analytical results on route 
discovery delay and the probability of a failure in route 
discovery based on accurate or inaccurate position informa- 
tion. We then use a simulation model to study the 
probability of a route discovery failure under destination 
mobility and inaccurate positions. We also use simulation to 
study the average number of hops for the generated routes 
and the end-to-end throughput. 
5.1 Analysis Results 
5.1.1 The Average Delay for rreq Transmission Cycle 
The major parameters in an A02P hrep contention period 
are set the same as those in HIPERLANl standard. The 
number of slots in the prioritization phase, the elimination 
phase, and the yield phase are 5, 12, and 9, with the 
duration time of 7.2 ps, 9 ps, and 7.2 ps, respectively. Time 
duration for the synchronization interval is 11 ps. Time 
duration for SIFS and DIFS are 28 ps and 128 p.s, as those in 
WLAN. Note that the duration of DIFS is longer than the 
duration of a complete yield phase. rreq, hrep, and ciifilr are 
transmitted at the rate of 1 Adbls, with the length shown in 
Fig. 2. An extra physical header of 128 bits is added to each 
frame. ack has an overall length of 240 bits and is also 
transmitted at the rate of 1 Afb ls .  
Fig. 7 shows the probability of a successful Iirep 
transmission. It shows that, when PL., the parameter for a 
node to adjust the burst length in the elimination phase, is 
correctly chosen, the probability for a successful Izrep 
transmission is very high even when there are a large 
number of contending receivers. The optimum successful 
transmission rate occurs at PL- = 0.65, where the probabil- 
ities of successful lzrep transmissions are above 95 percent 
for different number of contending nodes. 
The corresponding average delay for a node to determine 
its next hop (i.e., the average time for the completion of the 
rreq transmission cycle) is shown in Fig. 8. In R-A02P, 
64 bytes are added in hrep and ci?fi,r for Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange. The curves of the delays are like the reverse of 
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Fig. 11. Average number of hops in a discovered route at different 
position accuracy. 
those for the probabilities of successful transmission, which 
means a high transmission probability results in a low next when node density gets higher, the impact of the position 
hop searching delay. The results show that the average time error is less significant. 
for the next hop discovery is only a few milliseconds. This 
means that a large delay in A02P routing discovery can only 5.2 Simulation Results 
occur in a heavily-loaded network, where the delay for The simulation scenario is a network covering an area of 
channel access is high. such a delay may lead to a route 1.000 1) i  x 1.000 m, where a number of nodes are uniformly 
discovery failure if the destination mo\,es away from its deployed. The transmission range for the ad hoc channel is 
previously reported position (as shown in ~ i ~ ,  12). n u s ,  '250~11. The receivers are divided into 4 classes according to 
A02P can be looked at as a self-adaptive protocol as it the in 3.3. 
impedes a new data source to join a heavily-loaded network 
through causing route discovery failure and prevents the 
network congestion from getting worse. 
5.1.2 lmpact of Position Error 
Fig. 9 shows the probabilities of a routing failure for R- 
A02P in the worst case scenario when there are different 
maximum position errors. The results are based on the 
assumptions that 3-hop connections are needed and nodes 
are uniformly distributed. Routing failure increases as the 
position error gets worse. The analysis results show that 
Maximum position error (m) 
Fig. 10. Probability of routing failure at different position accuracy. 
5.2.1 lmpact of Position Error 
Fig. 10 shows the increased probability of a routing failure 
in A02P as the position error gets worse. The x-axis is the 
maximum position error E , , , , , : .  In simulation, the position of 
a node used for route discovery is a distance away from its 
real position. This distance is an assigned random value 
distributed uniformly between 0 and E , , , , , , . .  The data shows 
that when node density is high, i.e., greater than 150/km2, 
the probability of a routing failure is very low even when 
the position error is large. 
Fig. 11 shows the average number of hops for the 
discovered routes at different position errors. It shows that, 
as the value of maximum position error increases, the hop 
number increases. However, the increase in the hop number 
is not significant and will not have much impact on routing 
performance. 
5.2.2 lmpact of Destination Mobility 
Fig. 12 shows the probability of a routing discovery failure 
caused by destination mobility. Such a routing failure will 
not occur if the destination stays at the position known to the 
source. We define the parameter drift of destination as the 
distance that the destination is away from the position 
carried in the rreq for routing discovery. It shows that, as the 
drift value increases, the probability of a routing failure 
increases. The impact of destination mobility is more 
obvious in the network with low node densities. Fig. 12 
can provide the distance threshold value based on which a 
node has to update its position. For example, if the 
probability of a route discovery failure caused by position 
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Node density (/km2) 
Fig. 12. Routing discovery failure caused by the drift of destination. Fig. 14. Routing discovery failure in A02P, R-A02P,  and GPSR 
drift is required to be no more than 0.005, at low node 
densities (50 nodes/knz2), the threshold value should be no 
more than 30~n.. At high node densities (100 nodes/km2 or 
above), a node need not update its position unless it is more 
than 125 nl away from the position it reported last time. 
125 nt is the half of the ad hoc radio transmission range. 
Other than causing routing failure, the drift of destination 
can also lead to inefficient routing. Fig. 13 shows that the 
average hop number increases as the drift value increases. 
The reason is that the rreq is forwarded to the destination 
position. Therefore, a shortest path (in terms of number of 
hops) to the destination normally cannot be found. 
5.2.3 AOZP, R-AOZP, and GPSR Comparisons 
Fig. 14 compares the probabilities of a route discovery 
failure in the networks where A02P, R-A02P, and GPSR 
are used for route discovery. For fair comparison, GPSR is 
modified so that a node can be the next hop of a sender 
only when this node is closer to the destination. It shows 
that A02P and GPSli have approximately the same 
2.75l I 
20 40 60 80 1W 120 
Destination position drift value (m) 
probability for a routing discovery failure. R-A02P has a 
lower probability because it allows a node leading the rreq 
away from the destination to be the next hop. Note that, for 
R-A02P, the probability of a route discovery failure in 
simulation is higher than the analytical results obtained and 
shown in Fig. 9. The reason is that in simulation, a lot of 
nodes close to the boundary of the network are included in 
the routes. It is more likely that these nodes cannot find the 
legitimate next hop, which results in a route discovery 
failure. 
Fig. 15 compares the average number of hops for end-to- 
end connections. It is observed that GPSR has the smallest 
hop count, as it always uses the node that is closest to the 
destination as the next hop. R-A02P has larger hop counts 
than A02P, as nodes belonging to the class of lower priority 
(farther from the destination) and cannot win the hrep 
contention in A02P may be assigned to the class of higher 
priority in R-A02P and win the contention. In all cases, the 
average hop number of the routes decreases as the node 
density gets higher. 
--+--: GPSR 
2.85 1 I 
50 100 150 2 W  
Node density (/km2) 
Fig. 13. Average number of hops at different drift values. Fig. 15. Average number of hops for A02P,  R-A02P,  and GPSR 
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Fig. 16. Data packet delivery ratio in A02P, R-A02P, and GPSR 
Fig. 16 compares the simulated delivery ratio in the 
network when routes are discovered by different protocols. 
ns-2 is used as the simulator, as it has the well-developed 
CSMA/CA model. Network has a medium size and 
density, with 100 low-mobility nodes uniformly distributed 
in a 1.000 nt x 1.000 m area. The constant bit rate flow is 
used as data input for each connection, with the data packet 
arrival rate of four per second and a packet size of 512 bytes. 
The available data rate in an ad hoc channel is 1 Afbls. It 
shows that, generally, GPSR has the highest delivery ratio 
as it has the minimum hop count. R-A02P has the lowest 
delivery ratio. However, the routing performance degrada- 
tion in A02P and R-A02P is not significant. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
This research proposes a routing algorithm, named AOZP, 
to achieve communication privacy in ad hoc networks. 
Node position, instead of identity, is used for route 
discovery. Only limited position information is revealed 
to the network to protect node anonymity. In an enhanced 
algorithm R-A02P, the position of a reference point, 
instead of the position of the destination, is used to further 
improve destination anonymity. We use analysis and 
simulation to evaluate the routing performance for the 
proposed algorithms. 
In the MAC layer, we build an analytical model to 
evaluate the extra delay caused by the proposed receiver 
contention scheme. We find that the delay is small and a 
search for the next hop in A02P or R-A02P takes only a few 
milliseconds. Such a delay does not result in the failure of a 
route discovery even if destinations are highly mobile. 
In the network layer,,we first use analysis and simulation 
models to evaluate the impact of position error on route 
discoveries. It is observed that a large error may cause 
inefficient routing, i.e., routes built up with a greater number 
of hops, or may even cause a route failure. However, this 
impact is less significant in the networks with high node 
densities. For example, in a network with a node density of 
200/km2, the probability of a route discovery failure can be 
as low as 0.001 even if the position error is as high as the half 
of the maximum ad hoc radio coverage. We use simulation 
to study the impact of destination mobility. The movement 
of a destination makes its position known by the source 
incorrect. However, it is observed that a route discovery 
based on a "false" destination position may not necessarily 
leads to a route discovery failure. Again, in networks with 
high node densities, the impact of destination mobility is 
less significant. The results can be used to determine the 
distance threshold value in the distance-based position 
update system, where an ad hoc node updates its position 
when its current position is more than a distance away from 
the last reported one. Finally, we compare the routing 
performance between A02P/E-A02P and GPSR. We 
compare the hop counts in the routes discovered by these 
algorithms. It is observed that the routes in A02P or R-A02P 
have only marginally greater hop counts than in GPSR, yet 
GPSR requires much more position information. Simulation 
also shows that the corresponding end-to-end throughput 
degradation in A02P and R-A02P is not significant. 
Therefore, A02P preserves communication privacy ~ ~ i t h o u t  
significant routing performance degradation. 
We propose the following two future research directions: 
Privacy evaluation. Internal attackers are able to 
obtain pieces of position information of their targets. 
Based on this information, they can estimate the 
trajectories of their target or reduce the anonymity 
set. The level of destination anonymity can then be 
quantified by a probability of matching a position to 
any node ID. This can be calculated if node mobility, 
traffic pattern, and the policies-for position services 
are given. Future work will include building 
analytical models for mobility and traffic based on 
which node anonymity can be quantified. Other 
than probabilities, entropy and size of anonymity 
sets will also be considered as the metric for 
anonymity evaluation. 
Security issues and mitigation techniques. In 
A02P, the next hop is determined by node conten- 
tion. A malicious node can always use the most 
aggressive contention mechanism to become the 
next hop. Once it is included in a route, it can 
conduct different attacks, such as changing the 
position of destination in the routing request or 
dropping/fabricating data packets after the route is 
built up. More seriously, protecting the privacy of 
intermediate nodes in A02P makes it almost 
impossible to identify these attackers. A modified 
channel contention scheme will be developed. The 
next hop cannot be decided by a receiver itself, but 
by both the sender and the receiver. Information 
exchange is needed based on which a required trust 
between a previous hop and its potential next hop 
can be assessed. The privacy degradation due to 
such information requires investigation. Incentives 
for a node to be a forwarder at the cost of the 
degraded privacy has to be provided. 
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